

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY IN THE ZONE B

ABSTRACT: The most important achievement of the Communist led Yugoslav partisan resistance movement during the Second World War were the reintegration of Yugoslavia on the federal bases and the widening of Yugoslav state territory beyond the prewar border with Italy. This article concern with the establishment of the military administration of the Yugoslav Army in the Zone B. The main conclusion is that the establishment of the military administration of the Yugoslav Army in the Zone B was a result of the beginning of the Cold war and internal political circumstances in Yugoslavia.

The immediate post-war years (1945-1947) in Europe were characterised by Soviet military and political supremacy over the region east of the Elba. A new social system, National Communism, and new frontiers were founded in Eastern Europe as a result of the new international order, the so-called „Yalta system”, which was agreed between the Allies during the Second World War. In principle, the peace treaties restored the pre-war frontiers, but a few important changes were agreed upon. Of particular importance was the post-war change in the state boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy.

1.The Liberation of the Julian Region, March-May 1945

As early as November 1943, The National Antifascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko veće narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavije - AVNOJ), the supreme political body of the Communist-led partisans resistance movement, declared that the former Italian Julian Region, which had a substantial Slovenian and Croatian population, together with the great sea port and naval military base of Trieste, was to be part of Yugoslavia. Winston Churchill rejected this one-sided declaration and announ-

ced that, because of its military significance, the Trieste region would be put under the control of the Allies, and that Yugoslavia might submit its demand to a future peace conference.¹

In the spring of 1945, when Yugoslav troops had already liberated the Julian Region and were approaching Trieste, the British undertook a prompt operation to anticipate them. On 2 May 1945, New Zealand troops seized the dock area of the town, while the other areas had already been liberated by the Fourth Yugoslav Army and the Slovenian 9th Partisan Corps. The Commander of the Fourth Army was General Petar Drapšin and the Commissar was Boško Šiljegović. The Yugoslav Army had been organised very much on the lines of the Red Army and helped by the Soviet advisers. The Fourth Army was strong in artillery.

For the Yugoslavs the capture of Trieste, the rounding up of their frontier up to the Soca, was an understandable and legitimate aim, to be accorded a high priority. Vladimir Velebit, a Yugoslav diplomat and negotiator, whose family originated in Trieste, said in an interview with Joseph E. Jonson and John C. Campbell held at the office of the Academy for Educational Development in New York City in January 1972: „Trieste was one of the most important problems - national, ethnic and political - for my country. ... and furthermore we thought that we - the Yugoslavs - needed an efficient port for our trade operation. Why should we invest a lot of capital in building a new port when there was already a port in existence which had all the advantages necessary for our foreign trade?”²

In the Yugoslav Army war report of 30 April 1945, Marshal Tito claimed that Istria had been liberated, except for Pula. Despite the fact that Yugoslav Army troops entered Trieste on 1 May 1945, before the Western Allies, the News Agency Reuters reported that the New Zealand Division had occupied Trieste and Gorizia. The same day the Yugoslav News Agency Tanjug issued a communiqué from the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army stating that Trieste and Gorizia could not have been occupied by the New Zealand Division, as both of these towns had been liberated by the Yugoslav Army after hard and bloody struggles, and that some Allied forces had entered into the said towns without the permission of the Yugoslav Army. The Yugoslavs stated that this fact might have undesirable consequences unless the matter was settled promptly by mutual agreement. According to the February 1945 meeting in Belgrade, the use of Trieste and Pula as ports by the Allies, as well as the use of the lines of communication and the use of the railway from Venice through Udine to supply the Western Allies' military forces in Austria, should be settled between Marshal Tito and Field Marshal Alexander, but the River Soca should be regarded as the demarcation line between the Allied and Yugoslav forces. The Trieste crisis had definitely started.

¹ Tomszewski, Jerzy. (1989). *The Socialist Regimes of East Central Europe. Their Establishment and Consolidation 1944-1967*. London: Routledge, p. 139.

² Campbell, John C. (1976). Ed., *Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954*, Princeton University Press, pp. 77 and 82.

It is now recognised in historiography that the Trieste question was not only one of the last battlefields of the Second World War, but also the first battlefield of the Cold War.

2. 'People's Democracy' and the Yugoslav Army in Trieste, May 1945

On the occasion of the liberation of the Julian Region, the Yugoslav Army followed the same technique as had been evolved during the war years, the swift establishment of the Communist rule in regions from which they drove the Germans out. It was the model of „people's democracy”.

On the other hand, although proclaiming the federal government structure of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia regarded all the territories under its control as an integral part of Yugoslavia, controlled by the central government. In the aftermath of the Second World War, in May 1945, Josip Broz Tito opposed the tendency whereby „everybody in its framework creates a strong federal unit, Croatia, Serbia, etc., on the account of others, ... We are creating one state - Yugoslavia - in which every nation has its own rights and complete equality.”³ According to Josip Broz Tito, the Communists were an element of the Yugoslav cohesion. „There must not be the question: will this or that village belong to this or that federal unit, because it belongs to whole of Yugoslavia. Trieste is not only Slovenian, it is also Yugoslav. Rijeka is not only Croatian, it is also Yugoslav. Belgrade is not only Serbian, it is also Yugoslav.”⁴

At the end of the Second World War the National Communists, backed by the Soviets, seized power using the model „people's democracy”. Through this model the Communists succeeded in linking the anti-Fascist struggle and unsolved pre-war social and national grievances with their own ideological, political and economic aims. It was a modified version of Lenin's tactic of „linking the class question with the national question”.⁵

Bogdan Novak is certainly correct when he writes: „Yugoslavia effectively used both nationalism and ideology when entreating the support of the people of the Julian Region. She appealed to the national consciousness of Slovenians and Croats and expected them to demand unification with the majority of their nation in Yugoslavia. But she also beseeched the Italian workers of the region to prefer a socialist Yugoslavia to bourgeois capitalist Italy. ...

International events, nationalism, and ideology, together with Yugoslav and Italian propaganda, profoundly effected the people in Julian Region. The majority of Slovenians and Croats, mainly but not exclusively for nationalistic reasons, preferred Yugoslavia. They formed a strong political group, which supported Yugoslav territorial

³ Petranović, Branko. (1988). *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988. (The History of Yugoslavia 1918-1988)*. Beograd: Nolit, vol. III, p. 73.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ Obradović, Marija. (1995) „*Narodna demokratija*” u *Jugoslaviji 1945-1952. („People's Democracy” in Yugoslavia 1945-1952)*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.

claims. A minority among them, however, felt quite uneasy because of the communist regime in Yugoslavia. Mainly Italian workers living in industrial centers of the region preferred Yugoslavia too, for ideological reasons, as long as Yugoslavia remained a member of the Soviet block.”⁶

When Yugoslav troops entered Trieste, they connected with the anti-Fascist Italo-Slovenian underground movement, which had been active from the very first day of the German occupation. The Italo-Slovenian Executive Committee (CEAIS), formed on 6 April 1943, became the basis of the pro-Yugoslav civil administration in Trieste. On 1 May 1945 control within the City of Trieste was taken over by the Yugoslav Military Command, which proclaimed martial law. General Josip Cerni was appointed Military Governor of the city. Shortly afterwards General Cerni was replaced by General Dusan Kveder, a long-standing Slovenian Communist who had served in the International Brigade in Spain. Five days later, the CEAIS was constituted as the administrative body of the city.

The General Assembly of the CEAIS took place on 6 May 1945. New members were received to reach the total number of 18 (11 Italians and 7 Slovenians, the latter born and resident in Trieste). They formed the Council of Liberation of Trieste (CLT), which was entrusted with the provisional administration of the town. Its President was Dr Umberto Zoratti, an Italian Democrat; the Vice-President was Franc Stoka, and the Secretary, Rudi Ursic, both Slovenian Communists. The CTL was constituted by the members of the Communist, Socialist, Democratic, and National Slovenian parties, as well as by people of no party and even by a priest of Italian nationality.

On 17 May 1945, 1348 delegates of all social classes, who had been elected in the assemblies called in the factories, shipyards, business and banking establishments, navigation and insurance companies, and public and private offices in the quarters of the town, and, with the partisans, free professionals, etc., met in a Constituent Assembly and elected the municipal Consult, which was entrusted with legislative functions.⁷ Geoffrey Cox suggests that the delegates were elected at factory and shipyard meetings by trade unions and various pro-Slovenian and pro-Communist organisations.⁸

At the Constitutional Assembly, after the orchestra had played the Garibaldi anthem and the Yugoslav anthem, Rudi Ursic reported:

„We must state that the present solution is characterised by its provisionally on its way to stabilisation and by a clear separation between sincerely democratic and reactionary elements. The sincerely democratic elements perceive in the solution of an autonomous Trieste within the new Yugoslavia, of a free port of Trieste without any barrier of customs, without any prohibitionist, without any obsolete and useless obstructionism for the continental and intercontinental commerce which finds in Tri-

⁶ Novak, Bogdan C. (1970). *Trieste, 1941-1954. The Ethnic, Political, and Ideological Struggle*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. xvi-xvii.

⁷ *The Activity of the Council of Liberation of Trieste*. (1945). Trieste, p. 21-22.

⁸ Cox, Geoffrey. (1977). *The Race for Trieste*. London: William Kimber, p. 219.

este its most natural outlet for Central and Eastern Europe, the only means for the realisation of the popular and democratic aspirations. The reactionary elements are still blinded by the chauvinistic spirit, which transcends, denies treads upon the real interests of the people. The reactionary elements push on to solutions of various kinds (the prevalent Italian solution), but all of them have a common foundation: the struggle against the Yugoslav progressive democracy, the vanguard of the democratic world; the struggle against what represents unconditional progress, which has manifested itself in the war for national liberation; the struggle against people's power, ...

Somebody may ask: what was the reason for such a quick and decisive victory against the local Germans and their accomplices and the subsequent liberation of the city and normalisation of the city's life.

We must point out that the fulminous advance of the Fourth Yugoslav Army, which had, according to declarations of military experts, the characteristics of new exceptional strategy, as well as the armed insurrection of the masses of the citizens, are the causes which brought a rapid dissolution of the German war machine and of that of their local accomplices.

...

The struggle has not only strengthened the union among Italians and Slovenians of the town, but has also brought Trieste nearer to the Yugoslav complex as a whole and fraternized with it. The Croats and Dalmatians, as well as the Montenegrins of the Fourth Army, have come into the town as liberators, as democrats, as elements who fought, suffered and shed their blood and by that they have shown the intimate link established between the city of Trieste and the Yugoslav complex. It is not only the patriot of Trieste who has fought and is fighting for his native town, there are also sons of various Yugoslav peoples who felt the duty to liberate Trieste, who shed their blood with the aim to turn out the detested occupier. The three thousand dead of the Fourth Army on the heights surrounding the town have built an indestructible bridge between Trieste and Yugoslavia; the tenths of dead and more than four hundred wounded are the engagement's ring offered by Trieste to Tito's democratic and federal Yugoslavia.⁹

Ursic's speech was followed by the Slovenian anthem, played by the orchestra, while the audience applauded and acclaimed the Italo-Slovenian fraternity, the autonomy of Trieste within the democratic Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito and Marshal Stalin.¹⁰

The City's Commandant General Dusan Kveder greeted the first assembly of the City of Trieste on behalf of the General Staff of the Fourth Yugoslav Army. He emphasized: „It is the wish of our army to see Trieste like you wish to see it: a happy, democratic, anti-Fascist Trieste in the frame of a powerful, democratic, federal and progressive Yugoslavia. Our army is glad to greet in you the representatives of the majority, of the overwhelming majority of Trieste.

⁹ *The Activity of the Council of Liberation of Trieste*. (1945). Trieste, pp. 52-55.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 55.

Long live the autonomous Trieste in the federative democratic Yugoslavia.”¹¹

At the same time, in the territory of the City of Trieste the People’s Court was set up, an institution for judging the Fascist crimes against the existence and freedom of the people and its democratic institutions.¹²

Similar Committees of Liberation were established in Gorizia and the other towns and villages of the region. By mid-May 1945, the whole western part of the Julian Region, roughly up to the line proposed by Anthony Eden at Yalta, had been organised as a Region of the Republic of Slovenia and placed under the Slovenian Government in Ljubljana. During the course of May 1945, the Regional National Liberation Committee for the Slovenian Littoral and Trieste put into effect numerous decrees regulating social relations in the newly liberated territories. The President of this Committee was France Bevk and the Secretary was Dr Bogdan Brecej. The Public Prosecutor for the Slovenian Littoral and Trieste was Dr Stanko Peterin, and Dr Nedock Adelmo was appointed as the Public Prosecutor at the People’s Court.¹³ At that time, the Yugoslav Army had about 60,000 soldiers in this region.

3. The Morgan Line and the Belgrade Agreement, June 1945

Winston Churchill strongly opposed the incorporation of Istria, or any part of the pre-war Italy, into „New Yugoslavia”. On 7 May 1945 the British General F.E. Morgan, the chief of the Allied General Staff in the Mediterranean, was sent to Belgrade with the instructions to put forward a proposal for a line of demarcation - later to be called the Morgan line - which would give Field Marshal Alexander control of Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone, and of the territory up to and including the railway line to Villach. It was a modified version of the line put forward by Anthony Eden at Yalta, and amounted to a division of the Julian Region into a western segment, to be held by the Western Allies, and a much larger eastern segment to remain under Yugoslavia. British and American troops were already in much but, not all of the western area, their positions interwoven with those of the Yugoslav forces, also in that region. Josip Broz Tito rejected this proposal, but soon the Yugoslav Government was presented with an ultimatum by the Western Powers.

After Churchill’s Iron Curtain Telegram and Truman’s telegram to Churchill - Telegram No. 34 of 18 May 1945 - both Britain and the United States sent notes to inform the Yugoslav Government that they expected it immediately to agree to the control by Alexander of a region which must include Trieste, Gorizia, Monfalcone and Pula. The next day, Field Marshal Alexander issued an Order of the Day to the troops under his command intending partly to prepare them for possible battles ahead, partly as a blow in the war of nerves with Yugoslavia:

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 57.

¹² Ibidem, p. 63.

¹³ Ibidem, pp. 75, 81-86, 88, 90-98, and 100-101.

„It is however Marshal Tito’s apparent intention to establish his claims to Venezia Giulia and the territory around Villach and Kelgenfurt by force of arms and by military occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini and Japan. It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war ... it is our duty to hold these territories as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the Peace Conference.”¹⁴

Finally the Yugoslavs, yielding reluctantly to a virtual ultimatum, accepted the Morgan line of demarcation. According to the Belgrade Agreement signed on 9 June 1945, the Julian Region was to be divided into two zones. Trieste, Gorizia, Monfalcone and the countryside, up to and including the lines of communication to Austria, became the Zone A, under the direct Allied military administration. So too did Pula. The rest of the province became the Zone B and remained under Yugoslav military and civilian control. The Yugoslav Army would have to retreat to the east of the Morgan Line by 12 June 1945. Any Partisans would have to either go with them or remain and be disarmed. The Yugoslav Army could keep a token force of 2,000 men in the Zone A, but they would be confined to one district, and under Allied command. By the end of June 1945, Allied control over the whole area up to the Morgan Line was complete, and strong forces were now in position all along the line itself.

The administration of the Zone B based on the National Liberation committees continued. It remained divided into three parts; The Slovenian Primorska, Croatian Istria and the City of Rijeka. The highest civil authority for each continued to be the Regional National Liberation Committee for the Slovenian Primorska, the Regional National Liberation Committee for Istria, and the City National Liberation Committee for Rijeka. But the regional committees for the Slovenian Primorska and Istria ceased to be subordinate to the Slovenian and Croat governments respectively. Instead, the Military Administration of the Yugoslav Army (Vojna uprava Jugoslovenske armije - JA) became the supreme authority over all of the Zone B, supervising and coordinating the work of the National Liberation committees. The head of the Yugoslav military administration, General Veceslav Holjevac, was directly responsible to and received orders from the Yugoslav government. He also represented the Zone B abroad.

However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Centralni komitet Komunističke partije Jugoslavije - CK KRJ) overtook directing of the Party organisations in the Yugoslav Army by its decision of 10 August 1945. Thus the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia established full political control within the Zone B.

The Yugoslav military administration issued orders and decrees for the development of the economic and socio-political life of the zone. The National Liberation committees executed these directives. But the Yugoslav military administration had direct control over customs, traffic, finances, prices, and over the management of larger industrial and mining enterprises. It was also the supreme judicial authority.

¹⁴ Cox, Geoffrey. (1977). *The Race for Trieste*. London: William Kimber, p. 250.

Due to the Belgrade Agreement, the Zone B did not participate in the elections held on 11 November 1945 for the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly. When the Assembly met on 29 November 1945, some delegates of the National Liberation Movement from the Zone B were present, but only as guests.

The authorities in the Zone B abolished the 'coloni' (a relict of the feudal epoch) in Istria on 25 November 1945, and by the fundamental decisions of 1 July and 1 December 1946 began partitioning the land. As a consequence of the land reform, 3,393 tenants ('coloni') received 9,621 hectares of land at the expense of 957 landlords, though this amounted to less than three hectares per family. The abolition of the 'coloni' system marked the end of this feudal institution in the Julian Region. The land was given to the peasants as private property. The step favored Croat and Slovenian peasants against their Italian landlords. Italians laid the move to anti-Italian nationalist persecution, but in reality the reform was social and economic and tended to benefit Slovenians and Croats because they made up the bulk of the lower classes.

The same decree of 25 November 1945, which abolished the 'coloni' system, voided all the compulsory sales of Croat farms in Istria that had been auctioned after the First World War because the owner could not pay taxes or because of debts to Italian banks. Such land had to be returned to the original owner. The same directive also applied to Italians who had lost their farms, but only if they could prove they had fought in the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement (Narodnooslobodilacki pokret - NOB).¹⁵

4. The Paris Peace Conference, 1946

The issue of the final Yugoslav-Italian border had to be settled at the Paris Peace Conference in the summer of 1946. As the Peace Conference approached, the Yugoslav relations with the Western Powers became more and more strained.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija - FNRJ), in its memorandum of 14 February 1946, protested against frequent provocations by the Polish emigrant army in the Yugoslav-Italian border area since November 1945. This army fought on the Western Allies' side at the Italian Front during the Second World War. After the War, the Polish emigrant army had 120,000 men and was under the command of General Vladislav Anders. The Polish Army was helping the Yugoslav quislings, justifying this as „the struggle against Communism”. They also threatened to occupy the Zone B, which was under the control of Yugoslavia, and recruited especially „the Croatian terrorists” (the Ustashas) for that purpose.

¹⁵ Hrzenjak, Juraj. (1953). *Slovenačko primorje i Istra: Borba za slobodu kroz vekove. (Slovenian Littoral and Istria: The Struggle for Liberty through the Centuries)*. Beograd.

From February to August 1946, the Anglo-American Air Force continuously violated the Yugoslav airspace sovereignty. In August 1946 the Yugoslav Army shot down one American aircraft and another was forced to land near Bled. Both of them have entered deeply (about 50-70 km) into the Yugoslav territory.¹⁶

The Western Powers constantly opposed the Yugoslav claims for the revision of its north-western frontiers. Their governments did not respect the historical, ethnic and economic arguments of the Yugoslav delegation, neither during the preparations nor at the Paris Peace Conference. The Yugoslav claims were supported only by the USSR.

The West regarded the solution of the Trieste question in favor of Yugoslavia as the Soviets succeeding in gaining access to the Mediterranean; especially since Marshal Tito, as the President of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija -DFJ), had signed the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid and Post-war Co-operation with the Government of the USSR on 11 April 1945 in Moscow.

In the opinion of the Western politicians, awarding Trieste to Yugoslavia would have enabled it and the Soviets to interfere in Italian home affairs through their support to the Communist Party of Italy, one of the strongest Communist parties in Western Europe at that time. Undoubtedly, the Western Powers did not want to allow Trieste, as an important strategic point, the economic center of the Adriatic Sea and the major port of central Europe, to be part of Yugoslavia and the Communist World.

The Paris Peace Conference, attended by twenty-one nations, staggered along for nearly three months, from 19 July to 15 October 1946, with private Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meetings interspersed amid its public, and often acrimonious, formal sessions. The council, which retained the ultimate authority to pass on the peace treaties, met to pick up the pieces in New York from 15 October to 12 December 1946. The Conference closed with the Yugoslavs absent and still threatening not to sign the Italian Treaty. The Trieste question was resolved through bargaining and mutual concessions between the American and the Soviet delegations. The Italian Treaty was finally completed in December. The transformation of the American policy toward the Soviet Union between the end of 1945 and the spring of 1947 had a great impact on the solution of the Trieste crisis. By the late spring of 1947 the United States had in fact, if not in rhetoric, accepted Soviet control over much of Eastern Europe. At the same time, the United States was moving vigorously to resist Communist gains outside that sphere. After the CFM talks on Germany broke off in April 1947, French and Italian Communists were excluded from coalition in May and June of the same year.¹⁷

The Yugoslav-Italian frontier was internationally recognised in the Paris Peace Treaty, signed on 10 February 1947, together with the treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Yugoslavia signed the Italian Treaty, despite long months of protest.

¹⁶ Petranović, Branko. (1988). *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988. (The History of Yugoslavia 1918-1988)*. Beograd: Nolit, vol. III, p. 167.

¹⁷ Taubman, William. (1982). *Stalin's American Policy*. New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 162-164, and 172.

Under the Treaty, Gorizia and Monfalcone went to Italy. The City of Trieste and the coastal strip between it and the Soca, and the area of 32 km to the south towards Pula, became an independent Free Territory under the aegis of the United Nations. Yugoslavia continued to occupy the Zone B, while across the Morgan Line to the north and west, British and American forces occupied and administered the Zone A, including the City of Trieste itself.

The Italian Treaty gave Yugoslavia around 7,000 km² of new territories, with 470,000 inhabitants. Italy was obliged to pay 125 million dollars of war reparation to Yugoslavia within seven years and to return objects of artistic, historical and cultural significance. Yugoslavia stated in a special declaration when it signed the Peace Treaty that it did not renounce its territories, irrespective of subsequent ethnic changes in them.¹⁸

From the ethnic point of view, Yugoslavia obtained approximately 130,000 Italians, and Italy 115,000 Yugoslavs.¹⁹

Summary

The establishment of the Military administration of the Yugoslav army in the Zone B

According to the Belgrade Agreement, signed on 9 June 1945, the Julian region was to be divided into two zones. Trieste, Gorizia, Monfalcone and countryside up to and including the lines of communication to Austria became the Zone A, under direct Allied Military Administration. So too did Pula. The rest of province became the Zone B remained under Yugoslav military and civilian control.

The administration of the Zone B based on the National liberation committees. It remained divided into three parts, the Slovenian Primorska, Croatian Istra and the city of Rijeka. The highest civil authority for each continued to be the Regional National liberation Committee for the Slovenian Primorska, the Regional National Committee for Istra, and the City National Liberation Committee for Rijeka. but the regional committees for the Slovenian Primorska and Istra ceased to be subordinate to the Slovenian and Croat governments, respectively. Instead the Military Administration of the Yugo-

¹⁸ Petranović, Branko. (1988). *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988. (The History of Yugoslavia 1918-1988)*. Beograd: Nolit, vol. III, p. 172.

¹⁹ Wolff, Lee Robert. (1967). *The Balkans in Our Time*. New York: W.W. Norton, p. 309.

slav Army became the supreme authority over all of the Zone B, supervising and coordinating the work of the National Liberation committees. The head of the Yugoslav military administration, General Veceslav Holjevac, was directly responsible to received orders from the Yugoslav government. He also represented the Zone B abroad.

However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia overtook directing of the Party organisation in the Yugoslav Army by its decision of 10 August 1945. Thus, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia established full political control within the Zone B.